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INTRODUCTION
The Queen of Soul, Aretha Franklin, died in her home state of
Michigan in August of 2018. She left no will. Among the assets in her
estate may be her right of publicity-that is, the exclusive right to
exploit her name and likeness for commercial gain. But, was that right
extinguished by her death? If it survived, who will have the power to
exercise that right? The answer to these questions is . . . it depends.
Among other variables, it depends on where the heirs seek to enforce
the postmortem right, what choice of law rule is adopted by the courts
of that jurisdiction, and, finally, how courts interpret the applicable
substantive law.
The complexity arises because of the wide variation in the nature
and scope of state laws protecting an individual's right of publicity. For
foreign domiciliaries seeking to enforce their rights in the United States,
* Permission is hereby granted for noncommercial reproduction of this Article in whole or in
part for education or research purposes, including the making of multiple copies for classroom
use, subject only to the condition that the names of the authors, a complete citation, and this
copyright notice and grant of permission be included in all copies.
* IGT Professor of Intellectual Property Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of
Nevada, Las Vegas.
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their national laws may come into play as well. The differences among
the right of publicity regimes include, among others, (1) whether the
right is protected at all;' (2) what aspects of a person's identity are
protected; (3) what types of activities are actionable (e.g., commercial
versus noncommercial); (4) what exceptions and limitations exist; 2 (4)
alienability; (5) descendability; (6) remedies; and (7) the statute of
limitations.
Because of the aforementioned differences, conflict of laws issues
can arise when the unauthorized activity takes place outside of the
individual's domicile. 3 Because only a few right of publicity statutes
address choice of law, in most cases the choice falls to the court. There
are many possibilities, including the law of the person's domicile, the
law of the defendant's domicile, the law of the plaintiff's domicile (in
the case of plaintiffs asserting rights derived from deceased
personalities or persons who are assignees or licensees of another
party's right of publicity), the law of the forum, or the law of the place
where the infringement occurred. In some right of publicity cases, the
choice of law is outcome-determinative; this is frequently the case, for
example, where postmortem rights are involved.
While there have been calls for a uniform federal right of publicity,
there is no indication that Congress will take this up in the near future.
Furthermore, there are no international treaties harmonizing the right of
publicity or specifying a choice of law principle for cross-border
infringement claims.4 Accordingly, choice of law issues will continue to
arise in both domestic and international right of publicity disputes.
Courts have addressed choice of law problems in determining
whether the plaintiff possesses an enforceable right of publicity, the
nature and scope of that right, exceptions and limitations, as well as
remedies. In resolving these choice of law questions, courts take widely
I The United Kingdom still does not protect an individual's right of publicity per se. Instead, the
plaintiff must argue "passing off," which is an unfair competition claim akin to trademark
infringement and, therefore, requires proof that the unauthorized use is likely to cause confusion
as to the source or the affiliation. See Hayley Stallard, The Right ofPublicity in the United
Kingdom, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 565, 570 (1998).
2 Not surprisingly, Nevada has a statutory exemption for live celebrity impersonations. NEV.
REV. STAT. § 597.790(2))(b).
3 As discussed in Part II below, residence and domicile are similar, but not identical, legal
concepts. For simplicity, this article uses the term domicile. Also, because the plaintiffs in some
cases are estates, heirs, or licensees, rather than the individuals whose names or likenesses are at
issue, this article will refer to those non-plaintiff individuals (living or deceased) variously as
individuals, personalities, personae, or celebrities. The use of the term "celebrity" here does not
imply that the individual is necessarily famous; instead, it merely suggests that his or her identity
has been the subject of licensed or unlicensed commercial exploitation.
4 Even though many countries recognize some form of the right of publicity, the right is not
addressed in (i) copyright treaties, such as the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works or the WIPO Copyright Treaty, (ii) industrial property treaties, such as the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, or (iii) broader intellectual property
agreements, such as the TRIPS provisions of the WTO Agreement.
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varying approaches. This is especially noticeable in cases involving
postmortem rights, where the majority of courts have applied the law of
the person's domicile at the time of death. A few jurisdictions, however,
have rejected this approach.
The vast majority of these cases have been decided by federal
courts exercising diversity jurisdiction. Their choice of law decisions,
and often their decisions on substantive right of publicity laws, are
typically based on the rules they believe the forum states would follow,
rather than any laws that have actually been adopted by those states. At
any time, therefore, a particular state court or legislative body could
choose to reject these decisions and adopt different principles, and in a
number of cases they have done so. Nonetheless, as a practical matter,
the federal courts have played a significant role in developing right of
publicity laws, as well as the choice of law principles that pertain to
them.
Determining the best choice of law principle for right of publicity
claims, and persuading courts to adopt this principle, will enhance
predictability for potential plaintiffs and defendants in the foreseeable
future. To begin this process, this article takes a critical look at the
widespread practice of applying the law of the celebrity's domicile to
determine the existence of an enforceable right of publicity. This article
suggests that there are strong policy arguments against the domicile
rule, and that courts adhering to the rule are confusing disputes over
property ownership with disputes over liability for tortious injury to
property.
Part I examines the handful of state statutes addressing choice of
law for right of publicity claims. Part II examines some of the most
significant case law, including cases that have applied the law of the
domicile as well as cases adopting other approaches. Part III offers a
policy critique of the domicile rule. Part IV concludes that there are
strong policy arguments for rejecting the domicile rule, even in the case
of postmortem rights.
I. RIGHT OF PUBLICITY STATUTES ADDRESSING CHOICE OF LAW
Although state right of publicity statutes rarely address choice of
law, there are three exceptions: Indiana, Washington, and Ohio. The
statutes in both Indiana and Washington specify that the statutory right
of publicity applies to all personalities, living or deceased, regardless of
their domicile.5 Ohio's statute, in contrast, expressly limits its protection
5 IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-1 (West 2012) ("This chapter applies to an act or event that occurs
within Indiana, regardless of a personality's domicile, residence, or citizenship."); § 32-36-1-6
("'[P]ersonality' means a living or deceased person. . . ."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 63.60.010
(West 2008) ("This chapter is intended to apply to all individuals and personalities, living and
deceased, regardless of place of domicile or place of domicile at time of death.").
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to Ohio domiciliaries. 6
Despite the express choice of law provisions in the Indiana and
Washington statutes, courts have sometimes been reluctant to enforce
those provisions. One reason may be the courts' entrenched preference
for the domicile rule.
Before 2008, Washington's right of publicity statute did not have a
choice of law provision, although it expressly protected postmortem
rights. In 2005, the Ninth Circuit upheld a district court's decision that
the exclusive licensee of Jimi Hendrix's sole heir could not enforce
Hendrix's postmortem right of publicity under Washington law, because
the late musician was domiciled in New York at the time of his death.7
Washington's legislature immediately, and retroactively, amended the
statute to abrogate that decision.8 A few years later, the same plaintiff
brought suit against another infringer in the same district court, and the
court again applied New York law, holding that Washington's express
rejection of the domicile rule was unconstitutional. 9 Ultimately, the
Ninth Circuit reversed this decision, upholding the constitutionality of
Washington's decision to apply its own law to afford a postmortem
right of publicity to a non-domiciliary.10
In Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. Marilyn Monroe LLC, I
which involved consolidated cases arising in California and Indiana, the
Ninth Circuit simply ignored the Indiana statute's choice of law
provision, relying instead on Indiana's general choice of law rules:
"Indiana['s] choice-of-law rules dictate that in resolving these state law
claims we must apply the law of Monroe's domicile, New York, as
controlling on all substantive matters related to the estate and
disposition of property."1 2 Similarly, in another Marilyn Monroe case
arising under Indiana's long-arm statute, the Southern District of New
York found it appropriate to adopt Indiana's choice of law rules, rather
than New York's, 13 but did not apply the statutory choice of law
provision, finding it "untenable" that a law enacted after Monroe's
death could retroactively grant her a postmortem right. 14 Instead, the
6 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2741.03 (West 1999) (making the right applicable only to "the
persona of an individual whose domicile or residence is in this state" or "whose domicile or
residence was in this state on the date of the individual's death").
7 Experience Hendrix LLC v. James Marshall Hendrix Found., 240 F. App'x 739 (9th Cir. 2007).8 Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicensing.com Ltd., 762 F.3d 829, 834-35 (9th Cir.
2015).
9 Experience Hendrix, L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicensing.com, Ltd., 766 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1141 (W.D.
Wash. 2011).
10 Experience Hendrix L.L.C, 762 F.3d at 848.
11 Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. Marilyn Monroe LLC, 692 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2012).
12 Id. at 993 n.12.
13 Shaw Family Archives, Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 2d 203, 210 (S.D.N.Y.
2006).
14 Shaw Family Archives, Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 309, 314 (S.D.N.Y.
2007).
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court applied Indiana's general choice of law rule for construing a
decedent's will, which required applying the law of the decedent's
domicile. 15
Even when Indiana is the forum state, federal courts have reached
conflicting conclusions when asked to apply the statute to non-
domiciliary decedents. In 2010, the Southern District of Indiana applied
the statutory choice of law rule to allow a claim to proceed where the
decedent (1) was domiciled in Illinois, and (2) died before the statute
was enacted.1 6 The judge found that there was "no question that the
[s]tatute applies retroactively .. . . ."17 In contrast, the same court refused
to apply the postmortem provisions retroactively in a 2011 case
involving John Dillinger.' 8 The conflicting decisions led the Indiana
legislature to amend the statute in 2012 to make it explicitly
retroactive. 19
Ohio's statute appears to be unique in expressly limiting its right
of publicity protection to Ohio domiciliaries. As a result, non-
domiciliaries whose names and likenesses are exploited in Ohio will
have no remedy under the statute. However, Ohio also recognizes the
common-law right of privacy, which probably (although not explicitly)
protects non-domiciliaries from unauthorized commercial appropriation
even after the enactment of the statutory right of publicity in 1999.20
Is Id. The court did not need to decide whether Monroe's domicile was New York or California,
because it construed both laws as denying her a postmortem right. Id. at 315.
16 Donovan v. Bishop, No. 1:09-cv-275-WTL-TAB, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110204, at *15-16
(S.D. Ind. Oct. 14, 2010).
17 Id. at *16.
18 Dillinger, LLC v. Electronic Arts Inc., 795 F. Supp. 2d 829 (S.D. Ind. 2011). In another case
involving Dillinger, LLC ("Dillinger"), the Indiana Court of Appeals narrowed the location of the
postmortem right to a specific county for purposes of a venue dispute, holding that the situs of
Dillinger's right of publicity was wherever the plaintiff was located, because "under the rule of
'mobilia sequuntur personam,' the situs of intangible personal property is the legal domicile of
the owner." Phillips v. Scalf, 778 N.E.2d 480, 483-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). The court's approach
thus differed from most courts' interpretation of the domicile rule, which looks to the domicile of
the decedent, not the plaintiff. The Indiana court did not have that option, of course, because of
the state's statutory choice of law provision.
19 IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-8 (West 2014).
20 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2741.08 (West 1999) ("The remedies provided for in this chapter
are in addition to any other remedies provided for by state or federal statute or common law.");
see also James v. Bob Ross Buick, Inc., 855 N.E.2d 119, 122 n.2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006). In a case
predating the 1999 statute, which ultimately went to the United States Supreme Court, the Ohio
Supreme Court applied the commercial appropriation branch of Ohio's common-law right of
privacy to a probable non-domiciliary (Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 351 N.E.2d 454
(Ohio 1976), rev'd and remanded, 433 U.S. 562 (1977), discussed in infra note 99 and
accompanying text). After enactment of the 1999 statute, Ohio courts have continued to enforce
the common-law right against misappropriation of name or likeness-see, e.g., James, 855
N.E.2d at 122-23 (where plaintiff was a fifteen-year employee of defendant's car dealership, and
thus almost certainly domiciled in Ohio)-although they have not expressly addressed its
application to non-domiciliaries.
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II. THE LAW OF THE DOMICILE AND ALTERNATIVES
Unlike Washington, Indiana, and Ohio, most states do not provide
a separate choice of law rule for the right of publicity. In the absence of
a rule specific to the right of publicity, most courts have applied the
default choice of law principles that apply to property disputes, on the
theory that the right of publicity is a property interest. As a result, the
majority of courts have applied the law of the plaintiffs domicile, or in
the case of deceased persons, the law of the place where the decedent
was domiciled at the time of death.21
The domicile rule has been endorsed by Professor McCarthy, the
author of the leading treatise on the right of publicity. He justifies the
rule as follows:
This seems to be the only practical and fair rule to apply, and one
which is usually applied to other types of personal property.
The traditional rule, under both the First and Second Restatement of
Conflicts, for determining the testamentary or intestate disposition of
personal property is to look to the law of decedent's domicile at the
time of death. To avoid the lack of uniformity caused by applying the
law of different states to property located in different states, the
classic rule is to have the law of the decedent's domicile apply to the
entire estate.
It makes sense to apply the law of decedent's domicile to such an
issue in order to avoid having the post mortem right of publicity
viewed as "property" in the courts of one state and not in another
state as to the estate of the same deceased person.22
The courts' preference for applying the law of the domicile to right
of publicity infringement claims stands in sharp contrast to the favored
choice of law principles for other kinds of tortious conduct. In most tort
cases, courts apply either the law of the jurisdiction where the tortious
conduct occurred-lex loci delicti-or that of the jurisdiction with the
"most significant relationship" to the dispute, which is a determination
based on weighing a number of factors.23
Not every court has embraced the domicile rule. In fact, most of
the case law supporting the rule has involved postmortem rights. In
contrast, courts seem reluctant to apply the rule when it would deny
protection to the publicity rights of living individuals. To complicate
matters, much of the case law comes from federal courts exercising
212 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 11:15 (2d ed. 2018).
22 Id. at § 11:17 (citing WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 75(c)(3) (3d ed. 2002)).
23 16 SONJA LARSEN & KARL OAKES, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE: CONFLICT OF LAWS § 99, at
164-66 (2d ed. 2018); § 102, at 168-70.
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diversity or pendent jurisdiction. In deciding what choice of law rule the
forum state would adopt, these courts engage in a certain degree of
speculation. Nonetheless, since most right of publicity cases posing
choice of law questions are litigated in federal courts, these cases
accurately reflect the state of the law in practice, even if the federal
courts do not always correctly surmise how a state court would rule.
Some courts do not apply the law of the domicile at all, while
others apply it only to determine the threshold question of the existence
of a right of publicity enforceable by the plaintiff. When courts do not
use the law of the domicile, their preferred alternative is to apply the
law of the jurisdiction with the "most significant relationship" to the
dispute.
Even where courts apply the domicile rule only to determine the
existence of a right of publicity, this approach departs from the choice
of law principle applied to other torts. According to the Second
Restatement of Conflicts of Law, the question whether a plaintiff
possesses an interest that it entitled to legal protection should generally
be determined under the law that has the most significant relationship to
the occurrence and the parties. 24 The domiciles of the parties are only
one factor in this analysis. 25 In most cases, the applicable law will be
that of the place where the injury occurred. 26
A critique of the domicile rule must begin by considering the
reasoning that had led the majority of courts to adopt that rule. The
materials that follow examine some of the leading cases in several
jurisdictions. While most focus on postmortem rights, several involve
the rights of living non-domiciliaries.
A. California
A leading case applying the domicile rule to postmortem rights is
Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co.,27 where the defendant was advertising and
distributing merchandise throughout the United States that featured the
name and likeness of the late Diana, Princess of Wales. 28 Because
California's postmortem right of publicity statute did not specify the
choice of law, the district court turned to California's default choice of
law rules.29 California (like many states) ordinarily applies the
governmental interest analysis for choice of law determinations as to
whether a tortious act has occurred. 30 However, because the postmortem
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 158, 145 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
25 Id. §§ 6, 145.
26 Id. § 158.
27 Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1022 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
28 Id.
29 Id. at 1024-25.
30 Id at 1025.
72019]
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right of publicity is a property right in California, 31 the district court
instead applied the state's choice of law rule for personal property to
determine whether the plaintiffs possessed Diana's postmortem right.
That rule, which is codified in California Civil Code Section 946,
provides, "[i]f there is no law to the contrary, in the place where
personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its
owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile." 32
The decision to apply section 946 might have been justified if the
court had been adjudicating a dispute between two parties asserting
conflicting claims to inheritance of Diana's postmortem right. The court
asserted that "[section] 946 dictates that personal property is generally
controlled by the law of a decedent's domicile at the time of his or her
death," 33 a rule traceable to the common law.34 However, the common-
law rule addresses the question of how a decedent's property is
distributed.35 It does not address the question of what property the
decedent possessed in the first place. Thus, the common-law rule did
not mandate reliance on United Kingdom law to determine (i) whether
Diana possessed a right of publicity at all, (ii) whether that right
constituted a property right or some other kind of right, or (iii) whether
the right ceased to exist after her death.
Yet the district court found that the estate's infringement claim
was "quintessentially the type of situation in which the general rule of
section 946 is meant to apply because looking at the law of the domicile
ensures that the property right will not be recognized as part of the
Estate by some jurisdictions and not by others." 36 That could be true in a
property dispute between putative heirs, where there is a need to quiet
title in order to protect potential defendants against multiple conflicting
claims. However, even if the right of publicity is viewed as property, a
right of publicity infringement claim is not a dispute over title to
property; it is a claim of tortious injury to property. In Cairns, there was
no dispute over the ownership of Diana's postmortem rights, only a
dispute as to whether those rights were infringed in California. The
Cairns court did not explain why there would be a problem if Diana's
estate could control commercial uses of her name and likeness in one
state but not in another.
31 Id. at 1025. Under current law, this is codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(b) (West 2012). At
the time of the district court's decision, it was CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(b). Courts have held that
California's common-law right of publicity is a property right as well. Midler v. Ford Motor Co.,
849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988).
32 CAL. CIV. CODE § 946 (West 1872); see also Acme Circus Operating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711
F.2d 1538, 1541 (11th Cir. 1983) (applying section 946 to determine existence of Clyde Beatty's
postmortem right of publicity in a case transferred from California).
33 Cairns, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1026.
34 Id. (citing In re Moore's Estate, 12 Cal. Rptr. 436 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961)).
35 See, e.g., In re Moore's Estate, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 436-37.
36 Cairns, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1027.
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The Ninth Circuit upheld this decision, holding that neither
Diana's estate nor its exclusive licensee could invoke the protection of
California's postmortem right of publicity, because the United
Kingdom, Diana's domicile at the time of her death, did not recognize a
postmortem right of publicity. 37 Even though California's postmortem
right of publicity statute had recently been amended to state that it
applied to "acts occurring directly in this state," 38 the Ninth Circuit
interpreted this as a territorial limitation, rather than a choice of law
provision. 39 Accordingly, the plaintiffs could not bring a claim under
California's postmortem right of publicity.
Some federal courts in the Ninth Circuit have asserted that the
choice of law analysis in postmortem right of publicity claims should be
bifurcated, with the domicile rule governing the question whether the
right exists, and a different test-typically the "most significant
relationship" test-applying to the question of infringement. Cairns
relied on one such case, Joplin Enterprises v. Allen,40 in which the
estate of Janis Joplin (who was domiciled in California at the time of
her death) alleged that her postmortem right of publicity was infringed
by a biographical play that included a simulated concert performance.
Because Joplin's domicile, California, recognized a postmortem right of
publicity, the court reached the merits of the infringement claim. It did
not, however, carry out a conflicts analysis to determine which state's
law should govern the infringement analysis, even though it had
previously stated that the law of the state with the most significant
interest in the dispute should govern this analysis. Instead, it analyzed
the claim under both Washington and California law, implying that one
of these states must have had the most significant relationship to the
dispute. It was unnecessary to choose between them, however, because
the court concluded that the plaintiffs claim would fail, no matter
which state's law applied. 41
Although the Joplin claim ultimately failed on the merits (because
the California statute expressly exempted plays), if the defendant's
37 Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1148 (9th Cir. 2002).
38 Id. at 1145 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(n)). The California Legislature added this
language (and renumbered the statute) in June of 2000, just a few months after an earlier decision
in this case, where the Ninth Circuit had upheld the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs'
postmortem right of publicity claim under the predecessor statute, CAL. CIV. CODE § 990, using
the same default choice of law principle. See Diana Princess of Wales Mem'l Fund v. Franklin
Mint Co., Nos. 98-56822, 99-55157, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 34568, at *3-4 (9th Cir. Dec. 30,
1999). After the statute was amended, the plaintiffs filed a motion to reinstate their claim under
the amended statute, leading to the Ninth Circuit's 2002 decision.
39 The court based its interpretation on the legislative history of the amendments, which indicated
that the Legislature considered the statute language that would have extended protection to non-
domiciliaries, and that a second amendment to reintroduce that language was considered, but later
withdrawn. Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1148-49.
40 Joplin Enters. v. Allen, 795 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
41 Id. at 351-52.
92019]
10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT
activity had not been exempt, the defendant could have been held liable
under the law of Joplin's domicile, even if the defendant's activity were
lawful in the jurisdiction where it occurred, which appears to be
Washington. 42 In this case, because Washington did not have a right of
publicity law, the defendant's exploitation of Joplin's identity within the
state of Washington was lawful under the law of that state. Yet, under
the domicile rule, the defendant could have been held liable under
California law, even if the defendant's activity were restricted to
Washington. Such a result leaves a merchant at risk of liability under
foreign law, even for activities that are purely intrastate.
Only a few cases have addressed the choice of law question with
respect to living persons who are domiciled in jurisdictions that do not
recognize the right of publicity. 4 3 As discussed below, the courts in each
of these cases have found a way to avoid the domicile rule, in order to
recognize the living plaintiff s right of publicity.
In California, for example, the district court in Cairns-after
applying the domicile rule to deny California's postmortem right to a
deceased non-domiciliary-expressly declined to decide whether the
same rule should apply to living persons.44 Most such cases in
California have applied the law of the forum, which has typically also
been the plaintiff's domicile.45
However, during the interval between the district court and
appellate court opinions in Cairns, the Ninth Circuit held, in Downing v.
Abercrombie & Fitch,46 that California law applied to a right of
publicity claim brought by Hawaii residents, against the defendant, for
unauthorized commercial use of their names and likenesses in
California.47 Although the opinion does not discuss whether, or to what
extent, Hawaii recognized the right of publicity, no such right existed in
Hawaii at that time.48 One Hawaii state court had recognized a
common-law privacy right that protected against unauthorized use of a
private individual's name and likeness, based on allegations of
"humiliation, annoyance and embarrassment." 4 9 However, because this
was not the same as the property-based right of publicity recognized by
42 The court's opinion never mentions where the alleged infringement took place. It was almost
certainly Seattle, however, where for twenty-seven years, defendant Gaye Anderson operated a
New Orleans-themed restaurant, which featured live jazz and blues. Paul de Barros, 'Celebration
of Life' for Club Owner Gaye Anderson, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 20, 2012, 7:01 PM),
https://www.seattletimes.com/entertainment/celebration-of-life-for-club-owner-gaye-anderson/.
43 The major reason for the small number of cases is the increasingly widespread recognition of
the right of publicity, which leaves fewer jurisdictions where that right is completely unprotected.
44 See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1028 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
45 See id. at 1028-29 (collecting cases).
46 Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001).
47 Id.; Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1148 (9th Cir. 2002).
48 This is confirmed in Lightbourne v. Printroom, Inc., 307 F.R.D. 593 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
49 Fergerstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean View Estates, 441 P.2d 141, 142-43 (Haw. 1968).
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California, the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their right of
publicity claim if Hawaii law had applied. In fact, the district court
dismissed the plaintiffs' claims based on choice of law, although the
opinion does not report the district court's reasoning. The Ninth Circuit,
however, reversed on the basis of the governmental interest analysis.
Drawing a comparison to Hurtado v. Superior Court, in which the
California Supreme Court applied California law to a wrongful death
claim brought by Mexican plaintiffs (where Mexican law imposed a
limit on wrongful death injuries),50 the Ninth Circuit explained that the
choice of law analysis should favor California when the other
jurisdiction has no interest in having its own law applied:
As the [Hurtado] court stated, one of the primary purposes of
creating a cause of action in tort is to deter misconduct within its
borders by persons present within its borders. By distributing its
catalog within California, Abercrombie was operating within its
borders.
Hawaii, on the other hand, like Mexico in Hurtado, had no interest in
limiting the extent of relief that its residents could obtain for a
wrongful act against them in California. It is even more clear in this
case[,] because Hawaii did not place any limitation on recovery;
instead[,] it simply did not provide for the extent of relief California
does in this type of action. It is pure fancy to believe that Hawaii
would wish to restrict its residents from recovery that others could
obtain in California solely because it had not enacted a statute like
California's to complement its common law action for the same
offense. Hawaii had no interest in having its law applied to this
action brought in California.
The California Supreme Court has made it clear that when California
has an interest in enforcing its law within its borders[,] and a foreign
state (in this case Hawaii) has no interest in having its law applied,
then the law of California should be applied.51
Downing may answer the question left open by the district court in
Cairns: if the application of the domicile rule would leave a living
plaintiff without an adequate remedy for infringement of the right of
publicity, some courts will simply reject the rule.
Nearly fifteen years after Downing, a federal court in California
once again avoided applying the domicile rule to living nonresidents,
although in this case it did not allow them to invoke California law. In
Lightbourne v. Printroom, Inc., a former college football player sought
to certify a class action against a California defendant for making
50 Hurtado v. Superior Court, 522 P.2d 666 (Cal. 1974).
5' Downing, 265 F.3d 994 at 1006-07.
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unauthorized commercial use of photographs; 52 however, the putative
class included football players residing in different states. 53 This time,
the Central District of California did not even mention the domicile
rule; instead, it proceeded directly to the governmental interest analysis.
Unlike Cairns, which had treated section 946 as dispositive for property
claims, the Lightbourne court treated it as merely one factor in the
interest analysis-that is, as indicating California's view that a
plaintiffs state of residence has an interest in applying its own law to
the injury.54 This factor, in the end, was sufficient to dissuade the court
from ruling that California law should apply to the nonresidents.55
The Lightbourne court distinguished Downing, by pointing out
that, at the time of that decision, Hawaii had no right of publicity laws,
whereas the "vast majority" of states, including Hawaii, had adopted
some degree of right of publicity protection by the time of the
Lightbourne case. 56 To the extent that their laws differed from
California's, those states had a legitimate interest in applying their own
policy choices to their own residents. 57
The Lightbourne court's effort to distinguish Downing is not
persuasive. It turns on a distinction between a state that does not protect
a right at all (Hawaii in the past) and a state that protects the right to a
different degree (Hawaii more recently, and many other states). Both of
these are policy choices, and thus merit consideration in the interest
analysis. The court's analysis would have been more convincing if it
had found that Hawaii simply had not considered the policy question at
the time of Downing. If a state has had no occasion to consider whether
the right of publicity exists, it cannot have an interest in applying its
policy, because it has no policy to apply. In contrast, a state that adopts
a right of publicity, but makes it subject to express limitations, has made
a policy decision that it may have a legitimate interest in protecting.
In 2016, Downing led another court to reject the domicile rule in
Rams v. Def Jam Recordings, Inc.,58 which involved a right of publicity
claimant domiciled in Denmark, where (arguably) the right of publicity
was not recognized.59 Although the case was heard in the Southern
District of New York, the court was required to apply California choice
of law principles, because the case had been transferred from
California.60 Consistent with Downing, the court refused to apply the
52 Lightbourne, 307 F.R.D. 593.
53 Id. at 597.
54 Id. at 599.
55 Id. at 600.
56 Id. at 599.
57 Id. at 599-600.
58 Rams v. Def Jam Recordings, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 3d 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
59 Id. at 386.
6o Id.
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law of the plaintiffs domicile, and instead applied California's
governmental interest analysis.61 The court distinguished Cairns as
involving a postmortem right.62
B. Massachusetts
Long before California began edging away from the property-
based choice of law rule for non-domiciliaries, the First Circuit had
already adopted its own, somewhat bizarre, approach. In Bi-Rite
Enterprises, Inc. v. Bruce Miner Co.,63 United Kingdom recording
artists objected to the use of their names and likenesses on posters that
the defendant (a Massachusetts corporation) distributed in the United
States without the entertainers' consent. Two of the plaintiffs-Bi-Rite
and Artemis-were exclusive licensees of the recording artist's U.S.
merchandising rights; additionally, members of Judas Priest, Duran
Duran, and Iron Maiden were named as individual plaintiffs.64
The district court in Massachusetts did not undertake a choice of
law analysis on the question whether the right of publicity could be
licensed. Indeed, rather than considering the law of any specific state, it
simply stated a general principle, adopted by several circuits, that the
right can be assigned and licensed.65
However, on the question whether the British performers owned an
enforceable right of publicity in the first place, the district court applied
Massachusetts' choice of law rule for property, which looks to the law
of the property's situs. 66 Massachusetts courts, however, had never
addressed the situs of the right of publicity, leaving the federal court to
develop its own rule. Unlike many courts, the district court did not rule
that the situs of the right was the celebrity's domicile. According to
Massachusetts' highest court, the state's right of publicity statute 67
protected "the interest in not having the commercial value of one's
name, portrait or picture appropriated to the benefit of another." 68
Therefore, the district court held that the situs of a person's right of
publicity must be "where the 'commercial value' of one's persona is
exploited." 69
In determining the place of exploitation for purposes of this rule,
61 Id. at 386-87.
62 Id. at 386.
63 Bi-Rite Enters., Inc., v. Bruce Miner Co., 757 F.2d 440 (1st Cir. 1985).
64 Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Bruce Miner Poster Co., 616 F. Supp. 71, 73 (D. Mass. 1984). The
individual plaintiffs resided in the U.K. With respect to the performers who had licensed their
rights exclusively to Bi-Rite and Artemis, some lived in the U.S. and some in the U.K. Id at 75.
65 Id. at 73.
66 Id. at 74. Because the parties agreed that property choice of law rules should apply, (also citing
case law from the Second Circuit), the court had no reason to consider other possibilities.
67 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 3A (West 1973).
68 Bi-Rite Enters., 616 F. Supp. at 74.
69 Id.
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the district court held that domicile might be relevant; however, a more
important consideration would be "where the plaintiff has developed
and exploited his right of publicity through licensing agreements,
assignments or merchandising schemes." 70 The court's language here is
a bit confusing, as the "plaintiffs" in the case included individual
celebrities, as well as exclusive licensees of other celebrities. The
celebrities who licensed their rights exclusively to Bi-Rite and Artemis
might be viewed as having exploited those rights (i) only where Bi-Rite
and Artemis were located, or (ii) in every place where the licensed
products were distributed. The court's language also implies that the
place of exploitation would not include everywhere that the commercial
value of the persona was actually exploited (including unlicensed
exploitations by the defendant); instead, it included only those places
where that value was exploited with the consent of the celebrity. Under
this approach, a celebrity would be well advised to choose licensees
based on their place of incorporation.
With respect to the performers who had licensed their exclusive
rights to Bi-Rite and Artemis, the district court decided that the
existence of their publicity rights would be determined by the law of the
state where the exclusive licensees were incorporated (Illinois and
Connecticut, respectively). With respect to the individual plaintiffs, all
of whom resided in the U.K., the court applied the law of Georgia,
because their "merchandising representative" was located there.
Although Massachusetts was the forum state, and therefore provided the
choice of law rule, the opinion does not indicate whether any of the
defendant's infringing activities took place there; indeed, it does not
indicate where any of those activities took place.
From the court's description, and the fact that these performers
were named as individual plaintiffs instead of their representative, it is
clear that the Georgia company was not their exclusive licensee.
Instead, it was merely "responsible for policing and protecting the use
of the groups' names, logos, and likenesses."7^ Using the location of a
non-exclusive agent seems like a particularly slender thread on which to
hang the choice of law determination, especially since a celebrity might
have non-exclusive agents in several different jurisdictions. The district
court's willingness to adopt this dubious approach suggests that it was
eager to avoid the consequences of the domicile rule, which would have
left the members of these three prominent bands unprotected against
70 Id. The court bolstered this analysis by arguing that the law of New York-a jurisdiction that
had no connection to the case-required a right-of-publicity plaintiff to demonstrate that he had
exploited his right of publicity in a manner that showed his awareness of its commercial value-a
questionable interpretation of New York law that was based entirely on federal court decisions.
Id.
71 Id. at 75.
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unauthorized merchandising in many-if not most-U.S. jurisdictions.
Despite its somewhat bizarre reasoning, the district court's
decision was upheld on appeal.7 2 For reasons that are unclear, but which
probably reflect the positions adopted by the litigants, the First Circuit
considered only two options for the governing law: (i) the law of the
celebrity's domicile and (ii) the residence of the exclusive licensee or
merchandising representative.7 3 In contrast to the district court, the
appellate court attempted to ground its choice of law analysis more
firmly in Massachusetts law. It described the state's choice of law rules
as "in transition" between older and more modern approaches, and
suggested that the rigidity of the older approach was especially ill-suited
for the multi-faceted nature of the right of publicity:
The state has turned away from the rigid, single-factor analysis
associated with the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934) in
favor of the more flexible, multiple-factor, "interest analysis" or
"most significant relationship" analysis exemplified by
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict ofLaws (1971). Under the older
approach, courts determined which jurisdiction's law governed by
categorizing an action (as a tort, contract, or property dispute, for
example) and then looking to a single connecting factor (such as
place of injury, place of agreement, or situs of property). 74
The "right of publicity" does not fit neatly into any of the
categories-Tort, Property, Contract, etc.-which provided the
framework for traditional (First Restatement) choice of law analysis.
The alleged infringement in the present action implicates elements of
both Tort and Property law.
If Massachusetts still adhered to the single-factor mode of analysis of
the First Restatement, categorizing this action would be critical.
Indeed, the parties' briefs are largely dedicated to asserting that one
categorization or another is appropriate. However, Massachusetts'
choice of law rules no longer rest on such a rigid system.
Massachusetts' current approach is based on a set of overarching
principles and considerations applicable to all choice of law
questions.75
The appellate court, therefore, applied the "interest" analysis
favored by more recent Massachusetts case law as well as the Second
Restatement, and concluded that the United Kingdom had no real
interest in preventing its domiciliaries from enforcing their rights of
72 Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Bruce Miner Co., 757 F.2d 440 (1st Cir. 1985).
73 Id. at 442.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 445 n.2 (citation omitted).
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publicity in the United States. 76 In determining the interests of Georgia,
Illinois, and Connecticut, the court lumped all three states together,
referring to "the law of the United States," and disregarding any
differences among the laws of the three states. 77
Despite the lack of precision in its analysis, the First Circuit court
was the first to articulate a strong policy basis for rejecting the domicile
rule:
The final considerations listed in section 6(2) of the Second
Restatement are "certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result,
and ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied." With respect to these considerations, the better decision is
obvious. Any rule basing publicity rights on the nationality of the
performer would give rise to unnecessary confusion. To require
American producers and merchandisers of novelties to tailor their
expectations and actions according to the nationality of the
individuals depicted would be anomalous and unworkable. 78
The court also suggested, without elaboration, that applying the
domicile rule to give lesser commercial rights to foreign domiciliaries
than to Americans might amount to unconstitutional discrimination. 79
The end result in Bi-Rite is unique among right of publicity cases.
Although the court declined to apply the domicile rule based on the
actual domiciles of the celebrities, and purported to apply the
governmental interests test, the result was a bizarre version of the
domicile rule, under which the court used the domiciles of the
celebrities' licensing agents instead of the domiciles of the celebrities
themselves.
C. New York
The domicile rule remains firmly entrenched in New York, where
both state and federal courts treat the right of publicity as personal
property for purposes of the choice of law analysis.80 The property
characterization is ironic, both because the New York courts have
expressly characterized the right of publicity as a privacy right,81 and
76 Id. at 443-46.
77 Id. at 444, 446.
78 Id. at 446. The court added that the domicile rule created uncertainty for foreign performers
seeking to exploit their rights in the United States. Id. But, this argument is less persuasive.
Granted, some individuals might be uncertain as to what a court would consider their legal
domicile. However, for others whose domicile is clear, the domicile rule offers simplicity and
certainty, even if it is not the most economically beneficial.
79 Id. at 444 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that discrimination
against people of Chinese race and nationality who were seeking permission to operate laundries
denied equal protection and violated the Fourteenth Amendment)).
so Se. Bank, N.A. v. Lawrence, 489 N.E.2d 744 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1985).
81 Stephano v. News Grp. Publ'ns, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1984); James v. Delilah Films,
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also because the right is not descendible. 82 New York state and federal
courts do not take a bifurcated approach to the choice of law analysis;
where the plaintiff is a non-domiciliary, the courts have applied the law
of the domicile to all aspects of the claim.
In Southeast Bank, NA. v. Lawrence,83 a postmortem case with an
interesting twist, the estate of Tennessee Williams brought suit in order
to prevent the defendant from naming a Manhattan theatre after
Tennessee Williams. 84 The lower court did not undertake a choice of
law analysis and simply applied New York law.85 However, the New
York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the applicable substantive
law was that of Florida, because Williams was domiciled there at the
time of his death. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, under Florida law, the
only parties that can own a postmortem right are (1) those to whom a
decedent licensed his right of publicity during his lifetime, and (2) the
decedent's surviving spouse and children. 86 Since the plaintiff belonged
to neither of these classes, it could not assert Williams' postmortem
right under Florida law.87
The Second Circuit has construed New York law as applying the
domicile rule to living plaintiffs. In Rogers v. Grimaldi,88 Ginger
Rogers brought a right of publicity claim against the filmmakers and
distributors of a film that used her name as a character's name and in
the film's title. Because Rogers was domiciled in Oregon, which had no
statute or case law on the right of publicity, the Second Circuit was
forced "to engage in the uncertain task of predicting what the New York
courts would predict the Oregon courts would rule as to the contours of
a right of publicity under Oregon law." 89 After a convoluted analysis,90
the court concluded that Oregon's right of publicity law would protect
free expression to the same degree as the laws of New York and
California.91
Inc., 544 N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
82 The right is purely statutory, because New York does not recognize a common-law right of
publicity. Stephano, 474 N.E.2d 580.
83 Lawrence, 489 N.E.2d 744.
84 Id at 745.
85 Se. Bank, N.A. v. Lawrence, 483 N.Y.S.2d 218 (App. Div. 1984), rev'd, 489 N.E.2d 744 (N.Y.
Ct. App. 1985).
86 Lawrence, 489 N.E.2d at 745.
87 Id. Ironically, the lower court (which did not address choice of law at all) had interpreted New
York law as providing a common-law descendible right of publicity. Lawrence, 483 N.Y.S.2d at
223, rev'd, 489 N.E.2d 744. This position was repudiated by the Court of Appeals almost
immediately. Stephano, 474 N.E.2d 580.
88 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
89 Id. at 1002.
90 This included determining whether New York, in order to predict the future content of Oregon
law, should (1) presume Oregon's law would be similar to New York's, or (2) examine the law of
multiple jurisdictions. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1002-05.
91 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004.
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As recently as 2014, the Southern District of New York continued
to apply the domicile rule to living plaintiffs in accordance with New
York law. In Cummings v. Soul Train Holdings LLC, 92 the court
dismissed an Illinois domiciliary's right of publicity claims under New
York law against New York defendants, holding that the plaintiff could
bring his claims only under Illinois law.93 The Illinois claim failed,
however, because the activity fell within a statutory exception. As in
Southeast Bank and Rogers, the court did not distinguish between the
choice of law for determining ownership of the right and for
infringement; it did not even identify these as discrete issues.
Even though New York right of publicity and right of privacy
claims are based on the same statutory provision, which draws no
distinction between them,94 the Southern District of New York
consistently applies a different conflicts approach to each type of claim.
Even where a plaintiff brings both claims based on the same set of facts,
the court treats right of publicity claims as property claims subject to the
domicile rule and treats privacy claims as torts subject to the "most
substantial relationship" test.95
D. Ignoring Choice ofLaw
It is surprising how often right of publicity cases involving non-
domiciliaries are decided without any consideration of choice of law (at
least, none that is evident from the courts' opinions). When courts fail
to address the issue, they usually apply the substantive law of the forum
or of the place where the infringing activity took place. This has
happened in cases involving both living and deceased plaintiffs.
In Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen,96 the District Court of New
Jersey failed to address choice of law even though it would have been
outcome-determinative. Instead, the court simply applied the law of the
place where infringement occurred, without even acknowledging the
possibility that a different jurisdiction's law should determine
descendability. As a result, the court held that Elvis Presley's estate
92 Cummings v. Soul Train Holdings LLC, 67 F. Supp. 3d 599 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
93 The opinion does not indicate where the infringing materials were distributed, but given their
nature (DVD compilations as well as related television ads and internet videos), the distribution
was probably in multiple states, if not nationwide.
94 N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 51 (authorizing injunctive relief against unauthorized use of name,
likeness, or voice for purposes of trade, together with damages for "injuries sustained by reason
of such use").
95 See, e.g., Zoll v. Ruder Finn, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 3652(CSH), 2003 WL 22283830, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2003); Mathews v. ABC Television, Inc., No. 88 CIV. 6031(SWK), 1989 WL
107640, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 1989); Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp.
1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also Zoll v. Ruder Finn, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 3652(CSH), 01 Civ.
1339(CSH), 2004 WL 42260, at *34 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2004) (applying the "most significant
relationship" test to unjust enrichment claim arising out of the same facts as the 2003 decision).
96 Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
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could assert his postmortem right against the producer of a live
impersonation show in New Jersey. The court's analysis focused on
whether New Jersey common law would recognize a right of publicity
and, if so, whether it would also recognize a postmortem right. The
opinion makes no mention of Tennessee law, nor does it attempt to
weigh the respective interests of Tennessee and New Jersey. This was
significant, because at the time of this decision (1981), the question
whether Tennessee recognized a postmortem right was the subject of
conflicting decisions in multiple courts, 97 and the resulting uncertainty
was not resolved until legislation was enacted in 1984.98
The famous case of Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co.99 is another case in point, this time involving a living personality.
Although that case is best known for the Supreme Court's opinion
balancing Hugo Zacchini's right of publicity against the First
Amendment rights of a television news program, the case is also
noteworthy for considering only the law of Ohio, even though
Zacchini-a touring circus performer (the "human cannonball")-was
highly unlikely to have been an Ohio domiciliary, and was in all
probability domiciled in Florida.100 Because Florida recognized the right
of publicity at that time,101 the court's failure to consider Florida law
may not have been outcome-determinative, although there may have
been differences in the scope of protection.
In Apple Corps Ltd. v. Leber, the Los Angeles Superior Court
applied New York law to a right of publicity claim brought by the
licensee of the Beatles' right of publicity. 102 Without explanation, the
court made a conclusory statement that New York law applied. At no
point did the court discuss the domiciles of the Beatles (all of whom
97 See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd and remanded,
579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978); Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.
1980); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 652 F.2d
278 (2d Cir. 1981); Commerce Union Bank v. Coors of Cumberland, Inc., No. 81-1252-IlI, 7
Med. L. Rptr. 2204 (Tenn. Ch. Oct. 2, 1981).
98 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1101-1108 (1984).
99 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., No. 33713, 1975 WL 182619 (Ohio Ct. App. July 10,
1975), rev'd, 351 N.E.2d 454 (Ohio 1976), rev'd, 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
100 The plaintiff was the younger Hugo Zacchini, not his uncle, the original "human cannonball."
Lee Levine & Stephen Wermiel, Essay: The Court and the Cannonball: An Inside Look, 65 AM.
U. L. REv. 607, 611 (2016). Although none of the published opinions mention Hugo Zacchini's
domicile, the Zacchini family, like many circus performers, resided in Tampa, Florida. Paul
Guzzo, Hugo Zacchini, Who Wowed Crowds as Human Cannonball, Dead at 88, TAMPA BAY
TIMES (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.tampabay.com/news/obituaries/hugo-zacchini-who-wowed-
crowds-as-human-cannonball-dead-at-88/2302266; Obituary: Hugo Zacchini, DIGNITY
MEMORIAL, https://www.dignitymemorial.com/obituaries/tampa-fl/hugo-zacchini-
7 147149 (last
visited Aug. 30, 2018). No accounts of Zacchini's family suggest that any of the performers ever
resided in Ohio.
101 Florida enacted its right of publicity statute in 1967. FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (1967).
102 See Apple Corps Ltd. v. Leber, No. C299149, 1986 WL 215081 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 3,
1986).
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were still living in 1979, when the case was filed).1 03 Since the United
Kingdom recognizes no right of publicity at all, it is disappointing to see
no discussion of the choice of law issue in the court's opinion.
In KNB Enterprises v. Matthews, the plaintiff asserted the rights of
452 models from whom he had received assignments of their rights of
publicity.1 04 While the court's opinion focuses primarily on rejecting a
copyright preemption defense, it does note that the right of publicity is
assignable under California law.105 However, the court did not even
mention the domiciles of the 452 models, much less address the
existence and assignability of the right of publicity in those
jurisdictions.
Another interesting example is Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard,106 in
which Manuel Noriega, former dictator of Panama, brought a right of
publicity claim against the makers of a videogame in which he was
depicted. The court's brief order does not address choice of law at all,
and it resolves the suit on First Amendment grounds. At the time of the
litigation, Noriega was not a U.S. domiciliary. He had already served
prison terms in the U.S. and France and was serving an additional term
in Panama at the time he filed the suit. The court's order omits any
discussion of the Panamanian right of publicity or whether any such
right exists.
Although a court need not undertake a choice of law analysis if
there is no relevant difference in the laws of the jurisdictions,1 07 in
several of these cases the substantive differences were likely to be
significant. When the choice of law issue is overlooked, it is most likely
because the parties failed to raise it. Regardless of the reason, there is a
consistent pattern in these cases: when the court fails to consider choice
of law, it treats the plaintiff's domicile as irrelevant to the substantive
issues.
III. CRITIQUES OF THE DOMICILE RULE
The domicile rule presents a number of problems. First,
determining a person's domicile can be difficult, especially in the case
of celebrities that maintain homes in multiple jurisdictions. Second,
applying the domicile rule can add complexity to cases involving
multiple plaintiffs with different domiciles, such as members of a band
or plaintiffs in a class action. Third, the justifications for applying the
103 See Richard Harrington, $10 Million to Beatles, WASH. POST (June 5, 1986),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1986/06/05/10-million-to-beatles/ceO22ae-
1237-42db-9deb-6e7e020c2132/?noredirect=on&utm term=.fa0 1404facl.
104 KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713, 715-16 (2000).
LOS Id. at 715 n.2.
106 Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc., No. BC 551747, 2014 WL 5930149 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct.
27, 2014).
107 Id. at *28.
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law of the domicile to property disputes do not apply to disputes over
whether a particular kind of intellectual property exists as a matter of
law.
A. Difficulties in Determining Domicile
Determining a person's domicile can be difficult. Many celebrities,
such as wealthy people, athletes, and entertainers, maintain residences
in multiple jurisdictions. This uncertainty creates a burden on
merchants, who cannot know for sure which state's law governs the
personality rights in question without costly litigation.
There is no fixed legal definition for a person's domicile. Although
the terms are often used synonymously, 08 domicile does not mean the
same thing as residence.1 09 A person can have multiple residences, but
only one domicile. I0 While residence reflects a person's physical abode
at a particular time,'' the concept of domicile involves a person's
subjective intent to remain or return to that placel 12:
"[D]omicile" is the one location with which for legal purposes a
person is considered to have the most settled and permanent
connection, the place where he intends to remain and to which,
whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning, but which
the law may also assign to him constructively; whereas "residence"
connotes any factual place of abode of some permanency, more than
a mere temporary sojourn . . .. "Domicile" normally is the more
comprehensive term, in that it includes both the act of residence and
an intention to remain . 113
In determining domicile, courts typically consider a number of
factors, including "current residence, voting registration and voting
practices, location of personal and real property, location of brokerage
and bank accounts, location of spouse and family, membership in
unions and other organizations, place of employment or business,
driver's license and automobile registration, and payment of taxes."I14
In addition, domicile may have different meanings in the context of
different statutes. 1 5 In some contexts, residence and domicile may be
10 Smith v. Smith, 288 P.2d 497, 499 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1955); Whittell v. Franchise Tax Bd., 41
Cal. Rptr. 673, 676-677 (1964).
109 U.S. v. Venturella, 391 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Rosario v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 962 F.2d 220, 224 (2d Cir. 1992)).
110 Id
I Id.
112 See Gaudin v. Remis, 379 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2004).
113 Smith, 288 P.2d at 499.
114 Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., No. CV 05-02200 MMM (MCx),
2008 WL 655604, at *15 (C.D..Cal. Jan. 7, 2008) (quoting Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 750 (9th
Cir. 1986)).
''5 Kirk v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Cal., 78 Cal. Rptr. 260, 262-63 (1969).
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synonymous.1 1 6
It is possible for courts in different jurisdictions to reach different
conclusions as to a particular person's domicile.1 7 This could occur
because the jurisdictions apply different legal rules to the determination,
or because the courts draw different inferences from the evidence." 8
There is perhaps no better example of the difficulty of determining
domicile than the case of Marilyn Monroe. At the time of her death, she
maintained homes in both California and New York.1 9 She executed
her will in New York and named a New York attorney as her executor.
Then, she moved to California where she worked in motion pictures and
purchased a home in which she lived until her death the following
year.1 20 During this period, she also maintained a furnished apartment
and staff in New York.121 Her will was probated in New York over a
period of forty years,1 22 throughout which time, in order to avoid
California estate and income taxes, her executor consistently took the
position that Monroe was domiciled in New York at the time of her
death, submitting numerous documents to the California tax authorities
to support this claim.1 23 The heirs took the same position in successfully
defeating a claim against the estate by a person claiming to be Monroe's
biological child.1 2 4
Some forty years after prevailing in the tax proceeding, the heirs
asserted infringement of Monroe's postmortem right of publicity in
California. Initially, the district court ruled against the heirs, interpreting
California's right of publicity statute as denying postmortem rights to
persons who died before its enactment.1 25 A few months later, however,
the California legislature amended the statute to abrogate this decision,
and the court vacated its prior ruling and reconsidered the heirs'
claim.1 2 6
In the new proceeding, however, the court undertook a choice of
law analysis.1 27 If Monroe was domiciled in New York at the time of
her death, as the heirs had asserted in the prior tax proceedings, then she
could not bequeath her right of publicity, because New York did not
116 Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1181 (C.D.
Cal. 2008).
I17 RESTATEMENT § 11 cmt n.
118 Id
119 See Milton H. Green Archives, Inc. v. Marilyn Monroe LLC, 692 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir.
2012).
120 See id.
121 See id at 986, 988.
122 Id. at 986-87.
123 Id. at 987-89.
124 Id at 990.
125 Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., No. CV 05-02200 MMM (MCx),
2008 WL 655604, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7,2008).
126 Id at *14.
127 Id. at *14.
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recognize a postmortem right of publicity. 1 2 8 Accordingly, the heirs
would be unable to protect her postmortem right in California. 129
In contrast to their position in the prior tax proceedings, the heirs
now argued that Monroe was domiciled in California at the time of her
death. To explain their change of position, they asserted that they had
recently come into possession of "thousands of documents" relevant to
determining whether her domicile was in New York or California. 130
Because those documents were not yet before the court, the court held
that summary judgment on the domicile question would be
premature. 13 1 The court also refused to give definitive weight to the
finding of the California tax authority and a statement in the New York
probate proceeding that Monroe was a New York resident at the time of
her death, 132 because residence and domicile are not the same. 13 3
Ultimately, the district court managed to avoid addressing the
merits of the domicile question, because it held that the heirs were
judicially estopped from asserting that Monroe was domiciled in
California due to the contrary position they successfully asserted in the
tax proceedings.1 34 Applying the law of the decedent's domicile,
therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that Monroe's heirs could not assert a
postmortem right, even though California expressly recognized such a
right. Accordingly, Monroe had no postmortem rights in California, 35 a
decision the Ninth Circuit upheld on appeal.1 36
Given the complexity of the judicial estoppel analysis, it is
noteworthy that the district court preferred to resolve the case on that
basis, rather than address the domicile question on its merits. Had it
addressed the merits, the issue would have been extremely difficult to
resolve.
Another illustration is Rostropovich v. Koch Int'l Corp.137 In this
case, a Russian musician brought claims, under the New York and
128 Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1158 (C.D.
Cal. 2008).
129 Id.
130 Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc., 2008 WL 655604, at *15. In addition to Monroe's purchase
of a home in California, the heirs submitted that she had licensed her dog in California, attended
psychotherapy sessions in Los Angeles, and held a Connecticut driver's license with a California
address. Id. at *16.
131 Id. at *16.
132 Id at *18-19.
'33 Id.
134 Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 2d at 1198-99.
'35 Id. at 1199.
136 Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. Marilyn Monroe LLC, 692 F.3d 983, 1000 (9th Cir. 2012)
(calling it "a textbook case for applying judicial estoppel"). The Ninth Circuit also held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the executor "intentionally misled the
courts." Id. at 996.
137 Rostropovich v. Koch Int'l. Corp., 94 CIV. 2674 (JFK), 1995 WL 104123 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7,
1995).
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California right of publicity statutes, against a company that distributed
his recordings in the U.S. Originally a Soviet citizen, the plaintiff left
the Soviet Union in 1974, and his citizenship was revoked in 1978, at
which point he became a "stateless person." 38 Applying New York
choice of law rules (because New York was the forum state), the district
court stated that "the substantive law of a plaintiffs domicile generally
applies to a right of publicity claim."l 39 Under the circumstances,
however, the court found it "virtually impossible" to determine the
plaintiff s domicile.1 40 Accordingly, it abandoned the domicile rule, and
instead inquired which state had the most significant interest in the
outcome of the litigation. 141 The answer was New York, because the
plaintiff owned two homes there, and the defendants had offices and
engaged in business there.1 4 2
If courts have this much difficulty resolving domicile questions,
how, then, can an ordinary merchant selling celebrity-emblazoned t-
shirts, posters, or coffee mugs be expected to undertake the domicile
analysis for each celebrity he or she features? The people with the most
valuable rights of publicity will often be the very people whose
domicile is most challenging to determine. Moreover, even after the
domicile of a particular person has been resolved in one dispute, when a
merchant in a different jurisdiction faces a potential infringement claim
involving the same persona, there is no guarantee that the court hearing
that dispute would reach the same conclusion.
B. Multiple Plaintifs
In a case such as Bi-Rite,14 3 application of the domicile rule can
mean that identical claims by different plaintiffs in the same action must
be resolved under the laws of different jurisdictions. Even though the
Bi-Rite court purported to reject the domicile rule, its ultimate holding
was the equivalent of applying the domicile rule to the three
corporations.
The problem is even more pronounced in class actions, where
application of the domicile rule can preclude certification of the class,
even where the plaintiffs have all suffered the same injury by the same
defendant; without certification, it may be impractical for any of the
plaintiffs to obtain a remedy. For example, in Dryer v. National
Football League,144 where former football players alleged that the
138 Id at *1.
139 Id. at *8.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at *9.
143 See supra notes 63-79 and accompanying text.
144 Dryer v. Nat'l Football League, No. 09-2182 (PAM/AJB), 2013 WL 5888231 (D. Minn. Nov.
1,2013).
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defendant violated their rights of publicity by using their images in NFL
Films productions, the district court warned that class certification was
"highly problematic, if not unlikely," because each plaintiffs claim
might be governed by the law of the state where he resided or the home
state of his former team.145 The 25,000 putative class members resided
in twenty states, some of which had right of publicity statutes, some of
which recognized the right at common law, and the remainder of which
did not recognize the right at all. 146
C. Consistency with Analogous Doctrines
The law of the domicile has traditionally been applied to
competing claims to ownership of property. However, ownership
disputes are a far cry from disputes over the existence of intellectual
property or privacy rights.
According to the Second Restatement of Conflicts:
The functions served by domicil[e] in Conflict of Laws fall into three
broad categories. These are judicial jurisdiction; choice of law,
particularly in matters where continuity of application of the same
law is important, as family law and decedents' estates; and
governmental benefits and burdens. 147
None of these categories encompasses questions regarding the
existence or infringement of intellectual property rights. However, the
category of "matters as to which continuity is important" is the one
most closely related to intangible personal property disputes. The
Second Restatement offers the following examples of issues that fall
into this category:
In the area of choice of law, the law of a person's domicil[e] may
determine such matters relating to his personal status as the validity
of his marriage and his legitimacy. The same law governs the
transfer of his movable property upon death; it determines the
validity of his will with respect to such property or its distribution in
the event of intestacy. 148
For example, only the domicile can impose an inheritance tax on
intangibles included in a decedent's estate. 149 In the case of intestacy,
145 Id. at *5. Other possibilities included the law governing each player's contract, the law of the
NFL's home state, and the law of NFL Films' home state. Id.
146 Id
147 RESTATEMENT § 11 cmt c. The language in the 1988 revised version of the Restatement is
identical.
148 Id. In the case of real property, however, the law of the situs controls. Id. §§ 236 (intestacy),
239 (testamentary dispositions).
149 Id. § 11 cmt c. An interesting issue would arise if the decedent's domicile did not recognize a
postmortem right of publicity, but sought to impose an inheritance tax based on the value of the
postmortem right recognized in other jurisdictions. While this issue can be avoided if the law of
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the domicile would also determine which categories of persons are
entitled to inherit.150 For testamentary dispositions of personal
property,' 5' the Second Restatement indicates that the domicile will
determine whether an interest is transferred and the nature of that
interest.1 52 Other testamentary matters resolved under the law of the
domicile include a person's capacity to make a will or to accept an
inheritance, the lawfulness of a clause in a will, the required formalities,
and the type of estate created.1 53
None of these functions is the same as the determining whether (1)
the property exists in the first place, or (2) has been damaged or
misappropriated by a tortfeasor. Courts that apply the domicile rule in
deciding whether to recognize a non-domiciliary's right of publicity
have conflated these issues with issues pertaining to the lawfulness of
property transfers.
The right of publicity is not the only type of intellectual property
that is subject to different rules in different jurisdictions. At the
international level, laws pertaining to copyright, trademark, and trade
secrets will vary in different countries, despite a degree of
harmonization achieved through treaties and trade agreements. Within
the U.S., there are variations among the states in their laws protecting
trademarks, trade secrets, certain types of state-protected copyrights,' 54
ideas, and information. Despite these differences, courts rarely depart
from the principle that the eligibility of subject matter for protection
under any of these doctrines is a matter determined under the law of the
place where the unauthorized exploitation occurred. Applying the
domicile rule to deny the existence of a particular person's right of
publicity runs counter to this self-determination principle. In contrast,
applying the domicile rule to identify the owner(s) of the right of
publicity (e.g., in a dispute over inheritance) is consistent with the rules
that govern ownership in these other intellectual property doctrines.
One of the doctrines most closely related to the right of publicity is
the decedent's domicile determines the existence of a postmortem right in all jurisdictions, that
reason is not itself sufficient to overcome the other objections to the domicile rule. The parties to
the dispute can present evidence of the value of the postmortem right in the jurisdictions where it
is recognized, but can also argue that the value is too speculative to be subject to taxation,
especially if there is doubt as to whether, and to what extent, the estate will actually exploit the
postmortem right. In many cases, the issue will simply not arise, because value of the estate will
be below the threshold for taxation. See Jennifer E. Rothman, Whitney Houston Estate Settles
with the IRS over Right of Publicity Valuation, ROTHMAN'S ROADMAP TO RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
(Jan. 5, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/news-commentary/whitney-
houston-estate-settles-irs-over-right-publicity-valuation.
150 RESTATEMENT § 260 cmt b.
151 In the case of real property, however, the law of the situs controls. Id. § 239.
152 Id. § 263.
153 Id. § 263 cimts. a-c.
15 In the case of copyrights, certain state protections for older sound recordings have recently
been preempted by federal law. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2018).
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the right of privacy. In some jurisdictions, such as New York, the rights
are one and the same.155 The right of publicity corresponds closely to
the fourth branch of privacy law-the commercial misappropriation of a
person's name or likeness.1 56 In most jurisdictions, the two torts are
distinguished largely by the nature of the injury-economic harm for
the right of publicity and injury to feelings for the invasion of privacy.
Yet, in adjudicating privacy claims, most courts apply the law of the
place where the invasion occurred, unless another state has a more
significant relationship to the event and the parties. 157
Another doctrine that is closely analogous to the right of publicity
is common-law copyright. There are a number of common-law
copyright cases that illustrate these principles.
An early example is Ferris v. Frohman,58 in which an English
playwright sought to enforce his common-law copyright in the United
States, even though his play had lost its common-law copyright in
England, after it was publicly performed there. The U.S. Supreme Court
held that the loss of protection in England had no effect on the play's
common-law copyright in the U.S.: "The deprivation of the common-
law right, by force of the statute, was plainly limited by the territorial
bounds within which the operation of the statute was confined." 5 9
To similar effect is the 1925 case of Roberts v. Petrova,160 in
which a New York state court determined that the plaintiff had no
common-law copyright in his play in England. Adopting the reasoning
of the Supreme Court in Ferris, however, the state court held that the
loss of copyright protection in England did not deprive the play of its
common-law copyright in the U.S.161: "[I]f, as the defendant rightfully
contends, a statute conferring rights and remedies can have no
extraterritorial effect, how should the same statute have extraterritorial
effect for the deprivation of rights and remedies?" 62
A more recent example is Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of
America, Inc.,1 63 where the New York Court of Appeals upheld a claim
of common-law copyright infringement in pre-1972 sound recordings
made in the United Kingdom during the 1930s. At the time of the
dispute, the recordings had entered the public domain in the United
Kingdom due to the expiration of their fifty-year copyright terms. 16
155 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1909).
156 Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824-25 (9th Cir. 1974).
157 RESTATEMENT § 152. California applies the law of the forum, unless another state has a more
significant interest. Fleury v. Harper & Row, Pubs., Inc., 698 F.2d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 1983).
158 Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912).
159 Id. at 434.
160 Roberts v. Petrova, 213 N.Y.S. 434 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1925).
161 Id. at 436.
162 Id. at 435.
163 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2005).
164 Id at 264.
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However, the court held that the records were still protected by
common-law copyright under New York law, stating that "there is no
justification under New York law for substituting the British copyright
term in place of New York's common-law protection for
these recordings." 1 65 The court expressly rejected the argument that
New York was prohibited from recognizing copyright in a work that
was in the public domain in its country of origin. 166
A similar analysis applied to a common-law copyright claim in
Rostropovich v. Koch Int'l Corp.,167 where a Russian musician who
made recordings with orchestras in Russia during the 1960s brought
misappropriation and privacy claims against a company that later
distributed those recordings in the U.S. The court held that the musician
had a property interest in his performances under New York law, even
though he had no such right under Russian law: "Such property rights
arise under New York law and while Russian law may govern
intellectual property rights in Russia, Russian law has no force or effect
here regarding rights that arise under our laws."l 68
Thus, in the closely analogous area of common-law copyright, the
fact that one jurisdiction--even the plaintiffs domicile-denies the
existence of the legal right does not affect the rights of other
jurisdictions to recognize that right within their own territorial
boundaries.
The law of trade secrets is analogous as well, because a trade
secret is a type of intangible property. There can be no cause of action
for misappropriating a trade secret unless a court determines that the
plaintiff in fact possesses a trade secret. Whether a particular piece of
information qualifies as a trade secret in a particular jurisdiction
depends on how that jurisdiction defines a trade secret. Yet, the concept
of what constitutes a protectable trade secret has not always been the
same in every state. 169 Most courts addressing trade secret claims have
applied the law of the place where the misappropriation occurred-lex
loci delicti-even if the owner of the trade secret, and thus the injury, is
165 Id. at 265. The question was certified to the New York Court of Appeals by the Second
Circuit.
166 It probably did not occur to any of these parties to argue that the copyright status of the work
should depend on the domicile of its author. Determining the identity of the "author" of a sound
recording under U.K. law would have required a separate choice of law analysis. See, e.g., Itar-
Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1998).
167 Rostropovich v. Koch Int'l. Corp., 94 CIV. 2674 (JFK), 1995 WL 104123, at *34 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 7, 1995).
168 Id. at *6.
169 Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARv. J. L. & TECH.
427, 444 (1995) (collecting examples). However, the recent expansion of federal protection for
trade secrets in the 2016 Defend Trade Secrets Act is likely to reduce the importance of choice of
law in this field.
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located elsewhere. 170
Trademarks are another form of intellectual property with close
parallels to the right of publicity. A trademark has commercial value
because it represents the identity and reputation of a merchant, just as a
celebrity's name or likeness can derive commercial value from the
identity and reputation of the celebrity. Whether and to what extent a
jurisdiction will recognize a particular trademark as protectable depends
not on the laws of the merchant's domicile, but on the laws of the
jurisdiction where protection is sought.17 '
D. Conflict with State's Authority to Regulate Business
Allowing the law of a celebrity's domicile to dictate what
merchants in another jurisdiction can or cannot do permits the law of
one state to restrict the authority of another state to regulate business
within its borders. Merchants operating in one state, therefore, cannot
rely on the law of their own state to determine whether they are
operating lawfully. To the extent that states willingly adopt the domicile
rule, they are ceding a portion of their economic regulatory authority to
other jurisdictions and allowing another state's choices to control the
conduct of their own citizens. While a state certainly can choose such a
regime, the burden of that choice will fall on persons attempting to
conduct business in the state. It will also fall on the courts, which will
have to determine the domicile of each plaintiff and then ascertain the
relevant law of that domicile. In many cases, the domicile rule has
forced courts to guess what law another state might adopt. 172 In contrast,
where the forum state is also the place where the infringement occurred,
the rule of lex loci delicti would enable the court to focus on
ascertaining the law of its own jurisdiction-or developing that law if
the question is one of first impression.
170 See, e.g., Domtar Al Inc. v. J.D. Irving, Ltd., 43 F. Supp. 3d 635, 641 (E.D.N.C. 2014)
(plaintiffs claim under North Carolina trade secrets law was barred, because misappropriation
occurred in Canada); 3A Composites USA, Inc. v. United Indus., Inc., No. 5:14-CV-5147, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122745, at *10 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 15, 2015) (similar to Domtar, 43 F. Supp. 3d);
Chattery Int'l, Inc. v. JoLida, Inc., No.: WDQ-10-2236, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57512, at *12-13
(D. Md. Apr. 24, 2012); SciGrip, Inc. v. Osae, 13 CVS 2854, 2018 NCBC LEXIS 10 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Jan. 30, 2018) (rejecting "most significant relationship" test in favor of lex loci delicti,
meaning the place where the misappropriated trade secret was used).
17 See, e.g., ITC v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding Indian company's
trademark unprotectable under federal law, but certifying to state court question whether the same
mark was protected under New York law); Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., Inc., 391
F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying federal trademark and unfair competition law to determine
whether Mexican company had protectable trademark in California); Mead Data Cent., Inc. v.
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1030-31 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying New York
law to determine whether Minnesota company's trademark was sufficiently distinctive to be
protected against dilution); Paleteria La Michoacana v. Productos Lacteos Tocumbo S.A. De
C.V., 69 F. Supp. 3d 175 (D.D.C. 2014) (applying federal trademark law to determine whether
Mexican company had protectable trademark in District of Columbia).
172 See, e.g., Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1002-05 (2d Cir. 1989).
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CONCLUSION
The widespread reliance on the law of the domicile in cases
involving infringement of the right of publicity is an anomaly. Courts
addressing privacy claims, or infringements of other types of
intellectual property, generally apply the law of the place where the
wrongful conduct occurred, or else apply the "most significant
relationship" test. The adoption of the law of the domicile results from
conflating claims of tortious injury to property with disputes over
inheritance of personal property.
There are strong policy arguments for rejecting the domicile rule.
They include the difficulty of ascertaining domicile, the obstacles
created for cases involving multiple plaintiffs, and the imposition of one
state's policy choices on activities taking place in a different state,
especially where those activities fall within a state's traditional authority
to regulate economic activity within its borders.
Rejecting the domicile rule for postmortem rights poses one
problem, but not an insurmountable one. While sound policy arguments
favor applying either the rule of lex loci delicti or the most significant
relationship test to determine whether a postmortem right of publicity
exists, and for how long, ordinarily the domicile of the decedent
provides the substantive rules for determining who inherits the
decedent's assets, including the right of publicity. In most cases, this
bifurcated approach is feasible. However, there may be a few situations
where applying the law of the domicile would leave no heir to enforce
the right. Under Florida law, for example, unless a license was granted
during the persona's lifetime, only the surviving spouse and children
can enforce the right. 173 If this class has no members, then no one can
enforce the right, even if the jurisdiction where infringement took place
recognizes a postmortem right. If another heir steps forward to enforce
the right, the jurisdiction where infringement occurred would have three
options: (1) treat the right as no longer enforceable; (2) determine
whether the putative heir is the proper plaintiff under the general
inheritance laws of the domicile (as in the Indiana statute174); or (3)
make this same determination under its own inheritance laws, either
those of general application or those formulated specifically for the
right of publicity.
Finally, when infringement claims are based on the content of
broadcasts, transmissions, or publications that circulate in multiple
jurisdictions, applying the substantive law of each jurisdiction can lead
to conflicting results. However, this problem is not unique to the right
of publicity. It can arise with respect to other state law doctrines that
173 FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (2007).
174 IND. CODE § 32-36-1-16 (2002).
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protect intellectual property or personal rights such as reputation and
privacy. For broadcasters and other disseminators that do not wish to
limit their territorial reach, the safest strategy in these circumstances
will be to comply with the laws of the market that imposes the greatest
restrictions.
With respect to domestic law, all of these problems can be
eliminated by enacting a uniform preemptive federal right of publicity.
However, because it is highly unlikely that such a measure will be
enacted in the next few years, these issues will continue to challenge the
courts for the foreseeable future. In addition, even a uniform federal
right of publicity will not necessarily resolve issues pertaining to
plaintiffs who are domiciled outside the United States. For these
reasons, courts and legislatures that have defaulted to the domicile rule
in the past should re-examine this choice to determine whether it is the
best policy choice for the regulation of their internal markets.

